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self during its occupation of Kuwait. In
other words, there is a lack of research
on how Iraq administered and defend-
ed its ‘Nineteenth Province’. Under-
standing such internal Iraqi political
dynamics during the Iran-Iraq War or
the 1991 Gulf War would have been
critical to understanding how the
Iraqis would have defended the coun-
try in what is really the Third Gulf War.
One could argue that research on Iraq’s
internal dynamics during these two
wars could not be conducted due to
Iraqi government restrictions. Howev-
er, since 1999, an often under-utilized
electronic archive of four million cap-
tured Iraqi state documents from the Iran-Iraq War, as well as 300,000
documents from the 1991 war, has been publicly available. 
It is questionable that even the few works on Iraq were properly con-
sulted and analysed by the powers that conducted Operation Iraqi
Freedom. These doubts were confirmed when a UK intelligence dossier
on Iraq’s intelligence agencies, presented to Colin Powell in February
2003, was found to be plagiarized from a historical, academic article I
had written on Iraq’s intelligence agencies. After this affair, one must
ask how familiar the US and UK governments really were with Iraq be-
fore they launched this war. 
Assessing the war
The neglected study of the internal dynamics of Iraq’s domestic poli-
tics and security apparatus led to many failed forecasts when US and
UK forces went to war against those institutions of the Iraqi state. The
American and British media as well as the policy-making ‘think tanks’
provided many failed assessments of how the war would be fought.
Generally, these institutions predicted the S h i ' i population in the south
would revolt against their Sunni, Tikriti masters, leaving the toughest
battle to the ‘decapitation’ of the regime in Baghdad. On the contrary,
the S h i ' i t e s did not revolt, the most pitched battles were in the south,
and Baghdad fell relatively easily. It was predicted that Saddam’s élite
Special Republican Guard and security organizations would fight to
the very end to defend the capital; however, the para-military organi-
zations such as Fidayin Saddam, which did not have formal military
training, posed the most serious challenge to coalition forces. Finally,
Saddam’s feared weapons of mass destruction were not deployed
against military forces as they approached Baghdad.
The Iraqis were mistakenly classified into two camps: pro-Saddam
and anti-Saddam factions, and thus once the pro-Saddam factions
were vanquished, the anti-Saddam tendencies in Iraq would rally be-
hind the US. The US forecasts failed to account for the role of Iraqi na-
tionalism and the Iraqi citizens’ loyalty in defending the nation op-
posed to the regime. For example, reports on 25 March 2003 from
British military forces stationed around Basra, stated that civilians had
revolted against Iraqi government forces. In fact, no revolts occurred in
Basra; nor did they occur in most of the S h i ' i towns of the south. When
the leader of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,
Ayatullah al-Hakim, was asked about why no S h i ' a revolt materialized,
he said that ‘[t]here are a number of reasons why there has not been an
uprising, most important of which is that Iraqis perceive the United
In the US and UK policy analysis circles,
‘overnight experts’ dominated the air-
waves and the discourse on Iraq, which
would later influence those govern-
ment bodies that conducted the war.
As a confession, I was also featured
prominently in the US and UK media,
and believed that my assessments were
of more value since I had devoted my
academic career to studying Iraq. Yet,
even I made many of these failed as-
sessments, due to the fact that I left my
native country when I was a child and
since most of my views on Iraq where
influenced by the Iraqi exile communi-
ty. Nevertheless, the dearth of public
knowledge on Iraq led to many false predictions of how the war would
evolve and how the Iraqis would react to the American and British pres-
ence once Saddam was removed. 
Assessing Iraq’s past 
These failed forecasts could partially be attributed to American and
British academic circles, where the study of Iraq has been neglected,
with only a handful of scholars that can be genuinely characterized as
experts. The literature on Iraq suffers from a lack of research conduct-
ed within the country itself. Simple logistical reasons have led to this
deficiency, as archival work and fieldwork in Iraq was nearly impossi-
ble. While the literature lacks an internal analysis of how the Iraqi state
and society function and operate, several authors have published
works on Iraq’s internal politics. Prominent among them is Kanan
Makiya’s work, which gives a detailed background to the emergence
and foundation of the Iraqi security apparatus and Baath Party. While
his book The Republic of Fear is considered the textbook on Iraq’s inter-
nal politics, Makiya wrote the book while in exile. In the US and UK,
Peter Sluglett and Charles Tripp are among the few scholars who have
recently written on Iraq, while other known scholars include the Israeli
academics, Amazia Baram and Ofra Bengio. All have conducted their
research on Iraq from outside of its borders. In fact, the last substantial
work based on research in Iraq only covered the period up to the 1958
Revolution in Iraq; the late Hanna Batatu’s work is based upon the se-
cret records of the Iraqi monarchy, which were made public after the
1958 Revolution. Nevertheless, the few academic experts were not fea-
tured prominently in the media: perhaps out of their own volition; per-
haps they were never contacted. In fact, in the US and UK media circles,
former military generals dominated the media outlets, demonstrating
the media obsession with how Iraq was being destroyed. Little atten-
tion, however, was given to how it would be rebuilt. 
Much of the literature on Iraq has focused on its eight-year war with
Iran or the 1991 Gulf War, primarily devoted to the military aspects of
the wars, with no works dealing with the internal Iraqi politics during
the conflict. While the literature primarily dealt with the international
diplomacy surrounding the invasion and subsequent military conduct
of the 1991 Gulf War, there is a general lack of information on the
events that took place inside of Kuwait from 2 August 1990 to 16 Janu-
ary 1991. While numerous works have been written on the subject, in-
cluding military analyses, eyewitness accounts, and journalistic pieces,
not one has utilized primary documents produced by the Iraqi state it-
As Operation Iraqi Freedom has come to
a close, the US has declared victory in
achieving its objectives. Given the rapid pace
of this campaign, most analysis focused on
t h e course of events, with little academic and
often inaccurate assessment of the war and
i t s aftermath in Iraq. Such assessments are
crucial when addressing the question of
whether Iraq will survive as a viable state,
a s well as what form it will take. Faulty
forecasts about Iraq’s future, combined with
failing to understand its internal political
dynamics could have disastrous effects on
both the Iraqi people and the American and
UK forces stationed there. 
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States as an occupying rather than a liberating force. The second rea-
son has to do with people’s strong sense of nationalism, the painful
memories of the war of 1991, and the fear that anyone who rises up
against the regime will be crushed.’ After the Second Gulf War, in
March 1991 an uprising began in Basra and literally spread overnight
throughout the south of Iraq. However, the US failed to support this
uprising and Iraq’s Republican Guard brutally crushed it, leaving many
S h i ' i t e s feeling abandoned by the US, and such feelings among the
S h i ' a were not taken into account. 
Assessing Iraq’s future
Prior to the invasion of Iraq, many inaccurate assumptions were made
such as that Iraqi soldiers would not fight at all, American forces would
be greeted as liberators, and Iraqi exiles would be enthusiastically re-
ceived. Once the war had finished, assessments failed to take into ac-
count the almost immediate animosity directed towards the US once
Saddam was removed, and what the Iraqis envisioned for their future
state. Currently there are numerous, often contradictory, visions for a
post-Saddam Iraq, ranging from a US-supported, neo-Baathist Iraq in
the guise of a democracy, to a decentralized, federalist Iraq proposed by
the exile opposition and Kurdish groups. On the other end of the spec-
trum, many Iraqis are calling for an Islamic state/theocracy, with dis-
agreement over whether it should be formed on the Iranian model. 
As Iraq’s S h i ' i t e s mobilize to play a dominant role in Iraq, amply
demonstrated by their holy processions in the last week of April, US ad-
ministration officials admit they underestimated their organizational
strength and were unprepared to prevent the rise of an anti-American,
Islamic theocracy in the country. A Washington Post article stated: ‘As
the administration plotted to overthrow Hussein’s government, U.S. of-
ficials said this week, it failed to fully appreciate the force of Shiite aspi-
rations and is now concerned that those sentiments could coalesce into
a fundamentalist government. Others were more focused on the over-
riding goal of defeating Hussein and paid little attention to the dynam-
ics of religion and politics in the region.’ The US administration fears
that the Iraqi S h i ' a would come under the sway of Iranian influence.
Were some of these US officials to buy a copy of Yitzhak Nakash’s book,
they would realize that the Shi'ites’ strong sense of Iraqi nationalism
and a resistance to the Iranian concept of a single supreme S h i ' i t er u l e r
(velayet-e faqih) would keep the Islamic Republic’s influence in check. 
The failure to understand Iranian foreign policy, especially in the US,
could lead to disastrous consequences for the future of Iraq. Those in
the US administration that argue Iran should be denied an influence in
Iraq, ignore the centuries-old historical ties between the Iranian S h i ' i t e s
and those in Iraq and fail to comprehend the religious significance of
the holy sites in Iraq for all S h i ' i Muslims. US forces in Iraq cannot change
this historical legacy. Additionally, the idea of exporting the Iranian rev-
olution has long expired in Iran’s foreign policy, but rather the Iranians
are more weary of yet another American satellite state on the other side
of its borders. 
While the US focuses on alleged Iranian attempts to influence the
S h i ' a towns of Najaf and Karbala, there are mounting tensions develop-
ing in the predominantly S h i ' i district of Baghdad known as Saddam
City, which has now be renamed Sadr City, in honour of the clerical fam-
ily that has played a pivotal role for this community. For the most part,
US forces have not been deployed here, and the district has been run by
armed factions who support the Sadr faction in the growing contention
over who will dominate Iraq’s S h i ' ic o m m u n i t y .
As the American forces are focused on Iran’s attempt to influence
southern Iraq, they have neglected to maintain a strong presence in the
north. Perhaps they have not fully appreciated the historic conflict be-
tween the Kurds, Iraqi Turkomans, and Arabs in towns such as Kirkuk
and Mosul, and will not see the signs of the potentially dangerous eth-
nic conflict that is taking shape in this region. The forces of the Kurdish
Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan moved into the
northern Iraqi cities of Mosul and the oil-rich Kirkuk, despite Turkish
warnings not to do so, arguing this would be the basis for the creation
of an independent Kurdish state. Turkish troops have not been de-
ployed in northern Iraq as many analysts predicted, and yet the Kurds
have not indicated that they will withdraw completely from these cities. 
The failure to understand Iraq’s history and politics lead to many mis-
calculations of how Operation Iraqi Freedom would evolve, and how
the Iraqi people would react to US presence. Additional miscalculations
could have disastrous results. The US should heed the lesson of the
Great Iraqi Revolt of 1920, which united the disparate communities of
the S h i ' i t e s, Sunnis, and Kurds in the newly created mandate of Iraq in a
common animosity towards the British forces in Iraq. All the ingredients
are present for a second Great Iraqi Revolt. The Iraqi nation was created
from the ravages of the First World War, launched a nationwide revolt in
the 1920s, suffered through the Second World War, underwent revolu-
tions in 1958, 1963 and 1968, dealt with an almost continuous Kurdish
rebellion and a mass uprising in March of 1991, and had three disas-
trous wars with foreign powers. Neither Iraq nor the Americans sta-
tioned there need a second Great Revolution.
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